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Introduction 
The irrelevance of the EU to shape, or influence, its European neighbourhood was fully 
apparent throughout 2014, marking a continuation of the downward trajectory of the EU’s 
influence which has become the characteristic of the last half-decade in the region 
(Whitman and Juncos, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
 
The EU now confronts an arc of crisis running from its neighbourhood to the east through 
and across its southern borders in which it is being confronted by multiple security 
challenges. To its east it faces a direct challenge from Russia which is willing to use state 
power to alter borders and impose its will on its neighbours. In the Mashreq,1 the 
emergence of Islamic State (IS) has changed the dynamics of Syria’s civil war and impacted 
on the wider Middle East. An Israel-Palestinian peace process remains absent whilst the 
blockade of Gaza by Israel, entering into its seventh year, escalated into a seven week direct 
military intervention by bombardment and the deployment of ground forces by the Israeli 
Defence Forces from July 2014. Libya descended into civil war and state collapse, whilst in 
neighbouring Egypt military rule established in July 2013 was consolidated amidst rising 
political violence. The EU appears hapless and ill-equipped to confront these challenges. 
Only the eastern Maghreb offered the EU some consolation with Tunisia as the only state to 
have come through the Arab Spring with a democratic government replacing 
authoritarianism.  
 
                                                          
1
 This comprises the countries to the east of Egypt (i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria). 
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If there is an area where the EU is expected to play a role as a regional actor and as a 
regional leader is in the case of enlargement. Enlargement has been hailed by policy-makers 
and academics alike as one of the most powerful tools of EU foreign policy (Rehn, 2006; 
Vachudova, 2014). Enlargement is said to have extended peace and security to other areas 
of the continent through the democratisation processes fostered by the adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. In this way, the EU has been able to shape the perceptions and 
expectations, but also the behaviour of candidate and potential candidate countries. 
However, over the last few years, EU policy in the Western Balkans and Turkey has 
remained atrophied and a state of economic and political malaise holds back the 
enlargement of the EU, with the exception of Croatia, which was already quite well 
advanced on the path to membership.  
 
The EU’s Regional Diplomacy 
The EU’s response to the challenges in the neighbourhood in 2014 has demonstrated three 
characteristics. First, the EU’s structural diplomacy – its milieu, or region-shaping, role – has 
proven to have considerable weaknesses. Second, the EU’s capacity for crisis management 
diplomacy has been enhanced since the Lisbon Treaty reforms, but it remains a work of 
considerable imperfection. Third, distinctions need to be drawn between the roles that 
different Member States and the different EU institutional actors such as the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission are able to play, with the 
Member States still dominating issues of high politics. 
  
The EU as a regional actor in the Southern neighbourhood 
2014 was another sobering year as far as relations with the Southern neighbourhood is 
concerned. The high expectations that followed the Arab Spring revolutions failed to 
materialise for another year, with a new war in Gaza in the summer, the crises in Syria and 
Libya worsening and Islamic terrorism on the rise. Libya exemplified many of the problems 
in the region. International intervention failed to bring any peaceful and sustainable 
change in the medium term, with the country even more divided between two rival 
coalitions: ‘Libyan Dignity’ and the ‘Libyan Dawn’. Although the Muslim Brotherhood and 
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other Islamists parties lost in the general elections in June, they refused to accept the 
election results and forced the newly elected House of Representatives to flee Tripoli. 
Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar then sought to oust the Islamists from power by 
launching ‘Operation Dignity’, which then led to the rise of the opposition in the so-called 
operation ‘Libyan Dawn’.  
The EU’s ability to influence events on the ground has been very limited. Its strategy in 
Libya has focused on medium and long-term reconstruction and democratisation, and as a 
result, the EU does not have the capabilities necessary to deal with the deterioration of the 
security situation in Libya (Konstanyan and Blockmans, 2014). Its only CSDP instrument in 
the country, an Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya), 
launched in May 2013, is not a crisis management instrument and was forced to relocate to 
Tunisia in the summer of 2014. Its EU Delegation, one of the newest Delegations opened 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was forced to repatriate its staff due to the 
security situation in the country. What is more, according to Konstanyan and Blockmans, 
Member States have put commercial interests before an effective collective response to 
the Libyan crisis. In their words,  
Rome, Paris and London competed with each other to secure contracts with Libya for 
their own defence industries. Other European countries simply stood by and watched 
how, instead of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, Libyan armed forces 
received training from Egypt and its partners to counter successful attacks by 
fundamentalist militias (Konstanyan and Blockmans, 2014).  
In relation to the Middle East Peace Process, the EU has also failed to become a regional 
leader, although there are some recent developments that might change the perceptions 
of the actors in the region and their willingness to cooperate in the future. First, the EU was 
again a spectator to another Gaza war during the summer of 2014. The latest Gaza war 
followed a similar pattern to previous conflicts: Israel claimed that Hamas had started it by 
firing rockets over its territory, while Hamas argued that Israel was to blame for arresting 
hundreds of people in the West Bank and firing air strikes against Hamas members. The 
conflict left over 2,000 Palestinians dead, most of them (around 70 per cent) civilians, 
including over 400 children. Israel also used this offensive as an opportunity to dismantle 
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underground tunnels in Gaza. The EU did not play a role in the negotiation of the ceasefire, 
which was brokered once again by Egypt.   
However, positions in Europe vis-à-vis Israel hardened throughout 2014, and especially, 
after the conflict in the summer. Member States and EU institutions have become 
increasingly frustrated by Israel’s settlement policy, with some Member State governments 
more inclined to use the recognition tool as a way to influence Israel’s policies. As a result, 
2014 witnessed a series of non-binding votes in key Member State Parliaments 
recommending the recognition of Palestine, including the British, French, Irish, Portuguese 
and Spanish Parliaments. The European Parliament also held a vote on a non-binding 
motion at the end of 2014 supporting the recognition of Palestine. Moreover, Sweden was 
the first EU Member State to formally recognise the Palestinian state in October. France 
was also very active within the UN context trying to table a UNSC resolution to re-launch 
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) with a new international conference on the matter, 
including a threat to recognise Palestine if Israel did not cooperate and retreat to the 1967 
borders by 2016. However, although some EU diplomats suggested the possibility of 
threatening Israel with sanctions,2 this possibility continued to be rejected by some 
Member States that prefer the use of incentives fearing that a tougher line on Israel might 
actually boost the far-right in the upcoming Israeli elections. Another issue that might 
challenge existing EU policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has to do with the European 
Court of Justice’s decision to declare void ‘on procedural grounds’ a 2003 Council decision 
to impose an asset freeze on Hamas.3 While it is likely that the decision will be appealed in 
2015, this puts more pressure on the EU to negotiate with the Palestinian militant group to 
find a solution to the conflict.  
While the EU has a long history of involvement in the MEPP, the fight against the Islamic 
State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) emerged as a new and pressing security issue in the 
Southern neighbourhood for the Union in 2014. Although many European countries did not 
consider ISIS to be a direct security threat, there were growing concerns about EU nationals 
travelling to the Middle East to join ISIS and coming back to their home countries as 
radicalised jihadists. The EU, however, was not expected and did not take a leadership role 
                                                          
2
 EUobserver.com, 18 November 2014.  
3
 EUobserver.com, 17 December 2014. 
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in military efforts to counter the threat posed by ISIS in Syria, Iraq and the wider region. 
Instead, the US led the fight against ISIS through an international coalition which carried 
out air strikes in Syria and Iraq, with most EU countries pledging support to the US’s global 
coalition.  
 
The EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine 
Throughout 2014, the EU’s activities on Ukraine were undertaken through three main 
strands. First, with the recognition of Ukraine’s new government and providing political 
support for its consolidation. Second, pursuing a ‘rebooted’ Association Agreement through 
the pressing ahead with the signing and preliminary implementation process with Ukraine. 
Third, diplomatic and sanctions responses to Russia for its invasion of Crimea and military 
role in Eastern Ukraine.  
Supporting the revolution 
The year opened with the hangover from the November 2013 Eastern Partnership summit in 
Vilnius still dominating the EU’s Eastern European agenda. The domestic political 
consequences in Ukraine of the decision not to sign the Association Agreement continued 
with the Euromaidan – Euro Square protestors – still in occupation of central Kyiv. At its 
December 2013 summit, the EU’s Heads of State and Government made clear their 
sympathy for the protestors and the departure of President Yanukovych from power as the 
key to reviving the Association Agreement that he declined to sign at the end of 2013 
(European Council, 2013).  
The Euromaidan protests were visited by the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) 
Baroness Ashton on several occasions and together with a steady stream of foreign 
ministers of EU Member States and members of the European Parliament. The Foreign 
Affairs Council made clear in its conclusions of 10 February that it was monitoring abuses of 
human rights and cases of violence, intimidation and missing persons, expressing its 
readiness to react quickly (although the manner was unspecified) to any deterioration of the 
situation on the ground (Council of the European Union, 2014). 
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The peaceful protests first turned violent in January after the Ukrainian Parliament 
legislated to repress the protests. EU condemnation and the imposition of sanctions on 
Ukrainian officials who were deemed to have ordered the violence against the protestors 
swiftly followed. A more violent turn of events took place from 18-22 February 2014, which 
witnessed clashes between protestors and riot police and killings by unknown snipers as 
demonstrators occupied government buildings in Kyiv. At the Foreign Affairs Council 
meeting on 20 February, the EU’s Member States maintained their vocal support for the 
demonstrators, called for political dialogue and agreed on targeted sanctions measures, but 
were in disagreement as to who should be sanctioned and from when sanctions should 
commence (Council of the European Union, 2014a). Events moved quickly over the next few 
days. The HR/VP visited Kyiv on 23 February as President Yanukovych was relocated to 
Crimea (and then departed for Russia) via helicopters supplied by the Russian Federation 
and while the formation of a new interim government was in progress. The crisis situation in 
Ukraine was marginally lightened by the leaking of recordings of U.S and EU diplomatic 
telephone conversations in which U.S. State Department officials were less than flattering 
about EU diplomacy. 4 
An extraordinary meeting of the Council on 3 March 2014 used strong words condemning 
the ‘clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by 
the Russian armed forces as well as the authorisation given by the Federation Council of 
Russia on 1 March for the use of the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2014b). The EU called on Russia to withdraw immediately its armed 
forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the Agreement on the 
Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine of 1997. 
With political power and state control in a condition of flux in Ukraine on 5 March, the 
Foreign Affairs Council also adopted sanctions focused on the freezing and recovery of 
misappropriated Ukrainian state funds. In a statement of the Heads of State or Government 
following an extraordinary meeting on 6 March, the EU underlined that a solution to the 
crisis must be found through negotiations between the Governments of Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation, including through potential multilateral mechanisms. Having first 
                                                          




suspended bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and discussions on the 
New (EU-Russia) Agreement, as well as preparations for participation in the G8 Summit in 
Sochi, in the absence of de-escalatory steps the EU set out a second stage of further 
measures and additional far-reaching consequences for EU-Russia relations in case of 
further destabilisation of the situation in Ukraine. 
In Ukraine the new interim government faced formidable problems in establishing its 
authority across the country, including the outbreak of secessionist demonstrations in 
Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s response to the political events in Kyiv was both hostile and 
belligerent and is examined below. In contrast the EU continued to lend its political support 
to the interim government in Ukraine and subsequently to the Presidential elections held on 
25 May and the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2014. It gave rather shorter 
shrift to the presidential and parliamentary elections in Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s 
Republics’ on 2 November describing these as illegal and illegitimate. 5  
 
Rebooting the Association Agreement 
Following the change of regime in Ukraine the EU moved swiftly to re-establish the 
momentum for the EU-Ukraine relations with the signing of the political provisions of the 
Association Agreement on 21 March. The remaining parts of the agreement, following 
technical preparations, were signed in Brussels on 27 June. While awaiting the completion 
of the ratification process on both sides, parts of the agreement came into force on 1 
November 2014 covering the respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of 
law; political dialogue and reform; justice, freedom and security; economic and financial 
cooperation. On 15 December 2014 the EU and Ukraine held the first meeting of the 
Association Council under the new Association Agreement. Work progressed on an updated 
version of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to guide the process of reforms and economic 
modernisation in Ukraine, with a view to securing its endorsement by the EU-Ukraine 
Association Council on March 2015. The EU continued to apply autonomous trade measures 
granting Ukrainian exporters continued preferential access to EU markets without awaiting 
entry into force of the trade provisions under the association agreement. Provisional 





application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) part of the Agreement 
was delayed until 1 January 2016. This was intended to allow for consultations on its 
implementation with the Russian Federation and with both Ukraine and Russia in a trilateral 
format. The EU also acted as moderator in discussions on energy security between Ukraine 
and Russia in bilateral gas talks, leading to an agreement on 30 October 2014 on 
outstanding energy debt issues and an interim solution that enabled gas supplies to 
continue throughout the winter.  
Just as important as the Association Agreement process were the financial support 
measures intended to support the new government in Kyiv. On 5 March 2014 the European 
Commission announced that €11 billion could be available over the next years, both from 
the EU budget and international financial institutions for economic and financial support 
measures as part of the support for Ukraine's economic and political reforms.6 In the short 
term these funds were intended to stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine 
and assist with the transition and encourage political and economic reform. One component 
of this support was to temporarily remove customs duties on Ukrainian exports to the EU 
(the legislation adopted on 14 April and entering into force on 23 April) and anticipating the 
tariffs-related section of the Association Agreement's provisions on a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area without waiting for its entry into force. The temporary tariff 
cuts entered into force on 23 April. On 9 April the Commission also decided to create a 
Support Group to ensure that the Ukrainian authorities have all the assistance they need in 
undertaking the political and economic reforms necessary to stabilise the country.  
 
The Russian reaction and the EU’s response 
Russia’s response to the events in Ukraine was to invade, occupy and annex Crimea to the 
Russian Federation and to pursue military intervention in Eastern Ukraine through proxy 
forces. Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, on 18 March 
demonstrations by pro-Russian groups in the Donbass area of Ukraine escalated into an 
armed conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk 
People's Republics and the Ukrainian government.  





The Russian Federation’s military intervention in Eastern Ukraine was both direct and 
indirect with military personnel and equipment entering the region without insignia and 
with Russian government denials that its forces were present. Russian intervention in men 
and material increased markedly in August, Russia also massed significant forces near the 
Ukrainian forces. These interventions were seen as responsible for the defeat of Ukrainian 
forces in the region early September. Despite the best efforts of the German-led peace 
initiatives the Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine increased through the final 
months of 2014.  
The EU sought to respond to this situation throughout via diplomatic initiatives as it quickly 
became clear that that there was no appetite for direct military intervention in support of 
the Ukrainian government by the United States, NATO or Ukraine’s Western neighbours. 
The EU’s diplomatic response to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine was led by Germany. For 
many commentators this represents a marked departure for Germany’s post-second world 
war diplomacy in that it has sought to take a high profile leading role on a major issue of 
international security (Pond and Kundnani, 2015). 
The main goal of the Berlin-led EU policy over Ukraine was to move the situation with Russia 
away from its military intervention and to establish a diplomatic process. This effort resulted 
in the Minsk Agreement of September 2014. The agreement was reached through 
considerable efforts on the part of Merkel, through her personal communications and 
meetings with President Putin, and considerable diplomatic efforts with Ukraine, Russia, the 
U.S. and EU Member States by Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s foreign minister. This provided 
a framework through which the EU sought to contain and to dampen down the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine. The HR/VP and the EEAS were bystanders to this diplomacy as the Member 
States, via Germany, drove the EU’s diplomatic response.   
A key component of the EU’s response to Russia’s intervention was sanctions. A first set of 
sanctions was agreed by the EU following Russia’s annexation of Crimea on 17 March 2014. 
These adopted ‘measures against persons responsible for actions which undermine or 
threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as 
persons and entities associated with them.’7 These measures were further strengthened on 





four separate occasions over the following two months expanding the number of individuals 
covered by the sanctions. 
A second set of comprehensive ‘tier-three’ sanctions was agreed by the member states on 
25 and 30 July 2014. These followed the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in 
Donetsk on 17 July. The Foreign Affairs Council of 22 July concluded that that those directly 
and indirectly responsible for the incident must be held accountable and brought to justice, 
calling on all states and parties to cooperate fully to achieve this end (Council of the 
European Union, 2014c). The EU urged Russia to use its influence over illegally armed 
groups to allow full access to the site and cooperation to recover remains and possessions 
and with the independent investigation. The EU also adopted further trade and investment 
restrictions for Crimea and Sevastopol, as part of the EU's policy of not recognising the 
illegal annexation. The EU announced on 29 July that it had agreed on a package of 
significant additional restrictive measures targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges 
with Russia. Following a request of the European Council, the Commission and EEAS 
proposed further steps to be taken against Russia which entered into forced on 12 
September concerned access to EU capital markets, defence, dual use goods and sensitive 
technologies.  
The agreement on these different rounds of sanctions between the Member States required 
considerable discussions to broker a common position that was acceptable to all Member 
States. Maintaining consensus between the Member States, with a divergent set of views on 
how to respond to Russia, was a major achievement for the EU. It was also a strong signal to 
Russia of the willingness of Member States to subsume their differences to allow for an 
unambiguous position on the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military involvement in 
Eastern Ukraine.  
Newly appointed High Representative Federica Mogherini, who had been perceived in some 
quarters as pro-Russian, chaired her first Foreign Affairs Council on 17 November 2014.8 
Against the backdrop of heavy shelling and reports of heavy weapons convoys in separatist 
held areas with, the Council urged all parties to implement fully the Minsk Protocol and 
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Memorandum without further delay. On 28 November the EU reinforced its sanctions 
targeting separatists in Eastern Ukraine.  
Beyond sanctions the EU’s Member States were more cautious in their interventions. In July 
2014 the Council established a Common Security and Defence Policy mission to assist 
Ukraine in this field. The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM) 
was intended to provide strategic advice for the development of sustainable, accountable 
and efficient security services that contribute to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine. 
EUAM Ukraine, headquartered in Kyiv, is an unarmed, non-executive civilian mission with a 
budget of €13.1 million launched on 1 December 2014. The EU and its Member States were 
also the biggest contributor to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), contributing 
about two thirds of both the mission's budget and monitors and the EU contributing €7m to 
the SMM budget through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.  
 
There is recognition in a number of quarters that the EU demonstrated a major systemic 
failing in its lack of comprehension of Russia’s thinking, and willingness to take direct action, 
against the deepening of the Eastern Partnership, and most especially on the direction that 
EU policy was developing on Ukraine (House of Lords, 2014). Russia’s active contestation of 
the EU’s role in its Eastern neighbourhood will require a major policy recalibration by the 
Member States and the EU’s institutions. It also fits into a more general pattern of the EU’s 
international relations that Menon characterised in last year’s Annual Review as ‘hard 
powerlessness’ with ‘normative delusions’ (Menon, 2014, p. 14).  
 
Regional actorness and enlargement  
2014 marked the tenth anniversary of the so-called ‘big bang’ enlargement of 1 May 2004, 
which saw the accession of ten new Member States to the EU. This momentous date 
provided a unique opportunity to reflect on the achievements and failures of the EU’s 
enlargement policy in this part of the continent and lessons learned for future enlargements 
(Grabbe, 2014). According to the Commission, ‘[a]ccession benefited both those countries 
joining the EU and the established Member States. Trade and investment have increased. 
The quality of life of citizens has improved as EU environmental, consumer and other 
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standards apply more widely.’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). In their assessment of 
the EU’s enlargements to Central and Eastern European countries, the volume edited by 
Rachel Epstein and Wade Jacoby concluded that  
on balance the EU has had stronger economic effects since eastern enlargement than 
political, and that all NMS [New Member States] have had significant problems with 
aspects of democratic consolidation. Moreover, although the EU gained 100 million 
new citizens and consumers through its eastern enlargements and has claimed a 
number of achievements through its enlargement policy, it is not clear the EU’s power 
has grown in global politics. (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014, p. 3).  
There have been important lessons learned from previous waves of enlargement that have 
led to changes in the enlargement strategy over the years, in particular, after the accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. While the importance of the meritocratic nature of the 
process remains, recent enlargement strategies have placed more emphasis on the rule of 
law (see Whitman and Juncos, 2013) and more recently on economic governance and public 
administration reform as three key inter-related pillars (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). 
The changes introduced into the enlargement strategy reflect the different nature of the 
challenges that the EU faces in the new candidate and potential candidates of the Western 
Balkans and Turkey, which have generally weaker rule of law and administrative structures 
and poorer economies than those of Central and East European countries. It also reflects a 
different opportunity structure than that of the 1990s and early 2000s. The 2004 
enlargement took place in a permissive international context, with Russia still debilitated by 
the end of the Cold War and where liberal democracy and Western economic models were 
seen as a panacea for progress. The current international climate is a rather different one. 
While Russia did not openly oppose enlargement to the CEEs, as it economy has 
strengthened, it has become politically more assertive and it has become increasingly weary 
of the EU’s enlargement agenda. This is particularly the case in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood, as discussed in the previous section, but Russian geopolitical influence can 
also be felt in the Western Balkans (Bechev, 2012). For example, Russia abstained from a UN 
Security Council vote on the extension of the mandate of EUFOR Althea (Merdzanovic, 
2014). Because of traditional political ties but also economic and energy dependence, some 
governments in the region began increasingly turning to Russia (Bechev, 2012). The war in 
14 
 
Ukraine also meant that countries in the region were being forced to take sides, for 
instance, when it came to sanctions against Russia, which Serbia did not adopt (Bechev, 
2014). The close relation between Serbia and Russia is also illustrated by the fact that 
Vladimir Putin was the guest of honour at Serbia’s military parade marking 70 years since 
liberation from Nazi occupation, with Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić stating that Russia 
was his country's ‘big ally’.9  
It is also important to note that Western sanctions against Russia might also have a negative 
effect in the Balkans given the level of Russian investment in the region. The decision to stop 
the construction of the South Stream Pipeline will also have serious implications. Hence, if 
the EU wants to balance Russian influence, it needs to start thinking about how to better 
use economic incentives and the promise of membership in the Western Balkans. According 
to Grabbe (2014, p. 54), ‘the EU faces a major strategic choice now: preserve the current 
Union by continuing to prioritize internal consensus over external effectiveness, or respond 
to the new external challenge by exerting its transformative power across the European 
continent to strengthen its neighbours and counter Russian influence’. It is interesting, for 
instance, that in the Commission’s 2014 Enlargement Strategy, there is a mention of the 
need to address earlier in the accession process the negotiating chapter on Foreign, Security 
and Defence Policy (Chapter 31) with a view to strengthen foreign policy cooperation 
between the EU and the candidate countries (Fouéré, 2014, p. 8). 
The opportunity structure has also changed because of the international financial crisis and 
its impact on the Eurozone countries (Whitman and Juncos, 2012, 2013). This has had an 
impact on the EU’s willingness and capacity to act as a regional leader and how the EU is 
perceived by the candidate countries. Although there are signs of recovery in some EU 
countries, the recovery is likely to be a slow one and the effects of the eurozone crisis will 
still be felt in the medium and long-term, in particular, in terms of the erosion of the EU’s 
transformative power in the neighbourhood. The Greek crisis, in particular, has had a very 
negative effect in the Western Balkans, not just because of the economic ramifications of 
the crisis given Greek investments in the region and the reduction in diaspora remittances 
(O’Brennan, 2013, p. 40, Pangiantou, 2013). The Greek crisis has also had two other crucial 
impacts on the region. First, it has damaged the role of Greece as a champion of the 
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 BBC News, 16 October 2014.  
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Western Balkan countries’ accession10 as the country is absorbed by how to solve its 
economic and political crisis. Second, it has damaged the image of the EU as promoter of 
prosperity. If after three decades of EU membership Greece is still struggling to achieve 
economic growth, modernisation and fighting corruption, how can the Western Balkan 
countries expect to overcome similar challenges? As summarised by Panagiaotou (2013, p. 
89), ‘the EU’s hitherto undisputable symbolic role as an ‘anchor’ of stability, as a one way 
path to prosperity and as a goal to be aspired to, may be losing its credibility and appeal for 
some of these countries.’  The eurozone crisis has thus damaged the EU’s presence in the 
Western Balkans and Turkey and possibly their acceptance of the EU’s regional leadership.  
In terms of capabilities, the EU’s enlargement process relies on one of its strongest tools: 
the promise of membership. However, as argued before, this incentive might have been 
somewhat eroded by the effects of the economic crisis and the increasing competition from 
other structural powers in the EU’s periphery. The main elements of the EU’s enlargement 
strategy have remained unchanged over the last decade (conditionality and a meritocratic 
approach). As summarised by the Commission in its most recent enlargement strategy: ‘The 
accession process is rigorous, built on strict but fair conditionality, established criteria and 
the principle of own merit. This is crucial for the credibility of enlargement policy, for 
providing incentives to enlargement countries to pursue far-reaching reforms and for 
ensuring the support of EU citizens’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). This strategy is 
supported by the screening processes and progress monitoring of candidate countries 
carried out by the Commission. However, this reporting mechanism is also not without 
faults. For some observers, the Commission needs to change its way of reporting to 
incentivise reforms, following the model of the visa liberalisation process: with precise 
roadmaps (clear criteria and similar criteria for all the countries), benchmarks, fair 
assessments with experts’ visits to the countries and clear (public-friendly) reports. This 
would facilitate regional competition by providing comparable data about the achievement 
of different benchmarks by each country (Knaus, 2014). Monitoring prior to accession is all 
the more important given that the EU lacks effective monitoring and implementation 
mechanisms after accession and that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism set up in 
                                                          
10
 Note, for instance, that it was at the Thessaloniki European Council when the EU first refered to the 
countries’ potential EU membership. 
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the cases of Romania and Bulgaria has not proven to be an effective one. The EU has been 
unable to prevent democratic backsliding in new Member States as illustrated by the case of 
Hungary (Sedelmeier, 2014) or a deterioration of the rule of law in Romania and Bulgaria. As 
far as financial instruments are concerned, the bulk of the assistance is delivered through 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). In 2014, the EU launched IPA II which will provide 
€11.7 billion for the period 2014-2020. According to the Commission strategy report, IPA II 
‘increases focus on priorities for EU accession in the areas of democracy and rule of law as 
well as competitiveness and growth, IPA II also introduces a sector approach, incentives for 
delivery on results, increased budget support and prioritisation of projects.’ (European 
Commission, 2014, p. 3). Although this is an important incentive for candidate countries, it 
still remains insufficient in view of the economic challenges affecting most countries of the 
region such as high unemployment and fiscal deficits.  
Another aspect to consider in terms of the EU’s actorness and leadership in the region refers 
to the EU’s willingness to act as a regional power and a regional leader. While the EU 
remains officially committed to further enlargement, in recent years however, there is 
evidence of ‘enlargement fatigue’ eroding support for expansion on the part of the Member 
States. Support for enlargement within the EU remains low. For example, according to a 
recent survey, a higher percentage of respondents within the EU is now against further 
enlargement (49 per cent) than those supporting enlargement (37 per cent) 
(Eurobarometer, 2014, p. 143). In the past, ‘enlargement fatigue’ signified the view that the 
increasing widening of the EU would have a negative impact on deepening, undermining the 
functioning of the EU. The notion of ‘absorption capacity’ was coined to capture the need to 
take into account the later objective when proceeding with future enlargements. Today, it 
would seem that both widening and deepening are seen with suspicion among some policy-
makers and the public. These dynamics have been accentuated with the rise of Eurosceptic 
parties in the majority of EU Member States, as illustrated by the results of the elections to 
the European Parliament in May 201411, and debates about migration coming from new 
member states and candidate countries (Grabbe, 2014, pp. 51-53). To paraphrase Hooghe 
and Marks (2009), this symbolises the end of a ‘permissive consensus’ on enlargement, with 
domestic politics expected to have more of an impact in the making of the policy in the 
                                                          
11
 See Hobolt’s contribution to this volume.  
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coming years (Grabbe, 2014). It is arguably in response to these domestic pressures that 
enlargement has disappeared from the new Commission’s list of priorities. In his opening 
speech to the European Parliament in July 2014 the newly designated President of the 
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that the EU ‘needs to take a break from 
enlargement’ and that ‘no further enlargement will take place over the next five years’. 
(Juncker, 2014, p. 11). There were even rumours that the new Commission would not have 
an Enlargement portfolio.12 Although such reports proved wrong - Johannes Hahn was 
appointed as the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement 
Negotiations in the autumn 2014 – these developments could undermine the credibility of 
enlargement by putting into question the long-standing commitment of the EU to further 
enlargement.  
This enlargement fatigue is also likely to have an impact on the transformational power of 
the EU (O’Brennan, 2013; Grabbe, 2014) and undermine its leadership role in the region. 
Enlargement fatigue has an impact in candidate and potential candidate countries reducing 
their willingness to implement conditionality-related reforms as uncertainty about the 
process increases. While Croatian accession might have provided some needed stimulus to 
the process, problems remain. An illustration of this is the declining support for EU 
membership among the candidate countries. While Macedonian citizens are still largely pro-
EU membership (56 per cent considered EU membership a ‘good thing’), support for 
membership has continued to decline in Turkey, where only 38 per cent considered 
accession to the EU a ‘good thing’; in Iceland, too, only a minority of respondents (24 per 
cent) consider membership to be a positive thing (Eurobarometer, 2013, pp.: 67-8), which 
explains why the new Eurosceptic coalition government decided to put negotiations on hold 
after coming to power in 2013.13  
Candidate countries will only be willing to adopt painful reforms if the EU offers credible and 
sizeable rewards which outweigh the costs of adaptation. The credibility of the enlargement 
process becomes even more significant in the case of the Western Balkans and Turkey given 
the set of domestic political challenges faced by these countries. This is compounded by the 
fact that new ‘hurdles’ have been erected in order to reassure the Member States that 
                                                          
12
 Euractiv.com, 5 September 2014.  
13
 Iceland officially withdrew its candidacy in March 2015, after six years of negotiations. 
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conditionality is being applied strictly and that the problems encountered during the 2007 
enlargement will not happen again. According to O’Brennan (2013, p. 42), ‘[a]n excess of 
enlargement fatigue has led to an excess of ‘accession fatigue’: transposition and 
implementation of EU laws in the Western Balkans has slowed to a standstill.’ The 2014 
Commission’s report on enlargement paints a bleak picture of the situation in the region. 
While there has been some modest progress in the cases of Albania, Serbia and Kosovo, in 
other cases, such as FYROM, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, there remain serious 
concerns. In general, the Commission found that that public administration ‘remains weak in 
most enlargement countries, with limited administrative capacity, high levels of 
politicisation and a lack of transparency.’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). There are still 
problems affecting the functioning of democratic institutions, in particular national 
parliaments, a need for more constructive and sustainable exchanges among competing 
political forces, strengthening the role of civil society organisations, and freedom of the 
media. Regarding the rule of law, the main challenges still relates to the need to improve 
the functioning and independence of the judiciary and fighting corruption and organised 
crime. Finally, in the area of economic governance, the Commission concluded that, 
There remain significant challenges in all enlargement countries in terms of 
economic reform, competitiveness, job creation and fiscal consolidation. 
Weaknesses with the rule of law and public financial management exacerbate 
the risk of corruption, negatively impacting on the investment climate. To date, 
none of the countries have produced a comprehensive and convincing domestic 
reform agenda (European Commission, 2014, pp. 5-6). 
The most positive development in 2014 was the granting of candidate status for 
Albania at the European Council in June. The initialling of a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with Kosovo in July was also hailed as a ‘milestone on Kosovo’s 
European integration path’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 25). By contrast, it was 
another year of stagnation in Bosnia, with no progress being achieved regarding the 
key conditions of membership, which refers to the implementation of the so-called 
Seidic and Finci verdict of the European Court of Human Rights.14 For its part, FYROM 
                                                          
14
 The verdict refers to the violation of rights of national minorities, other than the three ‘constituent peoples’ 
(Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), under the current Bosnian constitution.  
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seems to be backsliding, with the European Commission warning that failure to 
address the growing politicisation and independence of the judiciary and to address 
the deterioration of freedom of expression could lead to the recommendation for the 
opening of accession negotiations to be withdrawn. 
The latter case also highlights the significance of bilateral disputes in the enlargement 
process. In the case of the Greek/Macedonian dispute, 2014 saw no progress on the 
resolution of the ‘name issue’, with the Commission’s report recalling ‘[t]he failure of 
the parties to this dispute to reach a compromise after 19 years of UN-mediated talks’ 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 23). The report acknowledges that this bilateral 
dispute is having a negative impact on FYROM’s accession process. However, as with 
other disputes, the Commission considers this to be a bilateral matter and hence it has 
been reluctant to intervene directly in the negotiations (Geddes and Taylor, 2013), 
calling instead for ‘resolute action’ from the parties involved and for EU leaders to 
show proactive support.  
The current candidates have also seen how the Member States have become more 
involved in enlargement politics, with the process becoming increasingly 
intergovernmental in recent years. While the Commission still plays a central role, the 
Member States have been more closely involved in the opening and closing of 
negotiating chapters and in each stage of the process sometimes blocking progress 
because of bilateral disputes as in the case above or because of specific concerns. 
However, their role has not always been obstructive. In other cases, they have sought 
to move the process forward, with or without the support of the Commission. In 2014, 
it is worth mentioning two Member State initiatives, both of them led by Germany, 
which has become the new leader in enlargement (if only by default) (see also 
Whitman and Juncos, 2014). In August, Chancellor Merkel convened a Balkan summit 
in Berlin to reiterate the EU’s commitment to the European future of the region and to 
keep the pressure on these countries to implement EU-related reforms. The ‘Berlin 
process’ is to be followed by another summit in 2015 being hosted by Austria. 
Germany was also in the driving seat, this time in cooperation with the UK, for another 
initiative regarding Bosnia. The German-British proposal aimed to revitalise Bosnia’s 
accession process by removing the ‘Sejdic and Finci’ question and focusing on a broad 
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reform agenda, including economic issues, good governance, rule of law and some 
institutional questions, to make Bosnia a functioning state. According to this initiative, 
the EU would unblock the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement if Bosnian politicians signed a written commitment to this reform agenda 
(Merdzanovic, 2014). This initiative can be said to be problematic however, not least 
because it might be seen as yet another illustration of the EU ‘giving up’ in the face of 
recalcitrant domestic elites (de Borja Lasheras, 2014). While these are two welcome 
initiatives that show some much-needed re-engagement with the region, it is still not 
clear whether they will be able to mobilise support from other Member States towards 
the Balkans and the enlargement process, more generally. In the absence of this 
political support, the EU will continue to struggle to become a fully-fledged actor and 
regional leader in a less favourable context characterised by a re-emergence of 




Despite this being the one region where one would expect the EU to have some clout, the 
EU’s political and economic influence in its neighbourhood was marginal in 2014. 
Furthermore, the foundations of the post-Cold War regional order within which the EU was 
embedded, were called into question by the Russian Federation’s use of force to seize 
Crimea from Ukraine, its increasing meddling in enlargement politics, and the emergence of 
non-state actors such as IS with the capacity to overturn the authority and rule of existing 
nation-states. The EU’s milieu shaping goals and instruments are not equipped for these 
challenges. An EU response equivalent to the magnitude of these challenges did not take 
shape during the course of the year.  
 
The EU’s capacity for crisis management, and most especially the institutions created by the 
Lisbon Treaty, proved to be insufficiently capable of responding in spirit or substance to a 
neighbourhood which is being remade largely without the influence of the EU. The events in 
Ukraine have also demonstrated that Germany is willing to take an active and leading role in 
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EU diplomacy towards Russia, Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans and one which 
eclipses that of the other large Member States and especially France and the UK.  
 
The EU’s absence of a strategy for Russia, beyond hoping for indigenous economic and 
political reform, proved to be a major weakness in the EU’s approach towards its 
neighbourhood. Consequently a new divide has been consolidated in Eastern Europe with 
EU and Russian spheres of predominant influence. On the one side of the divide lie those 
states that are willing, and able, to deepen their relationship with the EU; and on the other 
side are EaP states with a restricted relationship with the EU due to economic and political 
pressure being exercised by the Russian Federation and that are resistant to domestic 
political reform processes.  
 
In the southern neighbourhood the states affected by the Arab Spring, excepting Tunisia, 
have not looked to the EU for assistance in political and economic transition processes. 
Rather, the EU is a bystander to the civil wars in Libya and Syria and is not mitigating the 
political and economic fragility of the majority of its southern neighbours.  
 
In the past decades, the EU was able to shape its neighbourhood through its enlargement 
policy, promoting democratisation and fostering economic reform. However, ten years after 
the ‘big bang’ enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe there are significant lessons 
learned as to the challenges faced by EU conditionality to promote deeper political and 
economic domestic reforms. In the context of a resurgent Russia and increasing 
enlargement fatigue within and outside the EU, the power of conditionality seems even 
more limited than it was previously the case. The stagnation of the enlargement process in 
the Western Balkans and Turkey constitutes a case in point.  
 
The new regional context for the EU is dislocation and instability and a challenge to which 
the EU has not yet created a diplomatic or economic strategy sufficient to contribute to 
security and stability. While it would appear that the EU edged out of its own economic and 
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